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‘restore to us the necessary BLIZZARDS’: Early Twentieth-Century Visions of 
Climatic Change 
 
In the first issue of BLAST (1914), Wyndham Lewis curses the mildness of the English 
climate on the grounds that it renders English culture and English art weak and insipid. 
Imagining that a harsher climate would foster hardier forms of English art, he seeks to 
instigate a change in climate, calling for a ‘USEFUL LITTLE CHEMIST’ to ‘restore to us 
the necessary BLIZZARDS’.1 Insofar as the Vorticist project centred on the embrace of 
immoderation, Lewis’s extravagant call to alter Britain’s climate so as to foster hardier forms 
of British art is consistent with the Vorticist inclination towards extremes. However, Lewis’s 
attribution of a determining cultural influence to climate and his endorsement of the human 
modification of climate also invite consideration of the views of climate and climatic change 
– natural and anthropogenic – that were in circulation in the early twentieth century. In order 
to contextualise Lewis’s suggestion that climate determines life and art, his recognition of 
climate as changeable, and his claim that climate could – and should – be modified through 
human intervention, this paper will investigate early twentieth-century conceptions of the 
relationship between climate and culture, the period’s awareness of past climatic changes, the 
theories advanced to explain these changes, and the attitudes taken towards the possibility of 
human-induced climatic change. It will consider not only scientific arguments but also 
popular visions of climatic change circulating in fiction and journalism.  
Many theories regarding the causes of climatic change were in circulation by the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Climate historian James Rodger Fleming states:  
 
By 1900 most of the chief theories of climate change had been proposed, if not yet fully 




terrestrial geography, including the form and height of continents and the circulation of 
oceans; and changes in atmospheric transparency and composition, in part due to 
human activities. Of course, there were many others. […] [N]o single causal 
mechanism was universally accepted.2  
 
In consequence, the early twentieth-century discourse of climatic change exhibited an 
uncertainty that was distinctly modernist. As G. C. Simpson, alluding in 1922 to Alfred 
Wegener’s 1912 theory of continental drift, asked, ‘Where is there solid ground from which 
to discuss climatic changes if the continents themselves can travel from the equator to the 
pole and back again in the short period of one or two geological epochs?’.3 While this state of 
ongoing uncertainty may have been vexing for climatologists themselves, it was 
imaginatively generative, offering abundant matter for reflection and an open-ended 
invitation to literary invention.  
 Scholars such as Matthew Griffiths do valuable work by placing modernist texts in 
conversation with twenty-first-century conceptions of climate change, but there is also 
usefulness in registering the fact that there was a discourse of climatic change – and one that 
encompassed the concept of anthropogenic climatic change – in circulation in the early 
twentieth century.4 As Fleming observes, ‘the history of climate change theories and ideas’ 
stretches back to at least the eighteenth century and moreover ‘in eras other than our own, the 
climate has been perceived as amenable to human impact or intervention’.5 The present paper 
contributes to the project, exemplified in the recent edited collection Climate and Literature, 
of examining the discourses of climate and climatic change in circulation in specific 
historical moments.6 In order to preserve the sense of disjunction as well as conjunction 
between early twentieth-century discourse and that of the present, I will employ the then-




discussing early twentieth-century views of climate, its susceptibility to change, and the 
possibility of its alteration through human intervention. 
 
Cursing England’s Climate 
The first manifesto of BLAST opens with a denunciation of the English climate. Lewis 
declares: 
 
BLAST First (from politeness) ENGLAND 
CURSE ITS CLIMATE FOR ITS SINS AND INFECTIONS […] 
A 1000 MILE LONG, 2 KILOMETER Deep 
 BODY OF WATER even, is pushed against us  
 from the Floridas, TO MAKE US MILD. […] 
   CURSE 
the flabby sky that can manufacture no snow, but  
can only drop the sea on us in a drizzle like a poem 
by Mr. Robert Bridges.  
   CURSE 
the lazy air that cannot stiffen the back of the SERPENTINE,  
or put Aquatic steel half way down the MANCHESTER CANAL. (11-12) 
 
Lewis’s description accurately reflects the climate of the British Isles, a mild oceanic climate 
exhibiting a relatively small range of temperature and characterised by frequent but not 
extreme precipitation. As Jan Golinski observes, ‘It rains a lot, but intermittently and usually 
not very heavily. Prolonged periods of extreme heat and cold are rare’.7 Key factors 




As a 1910 article in Nature on the action of the Gulf Stream observes, ‘it has been known for 
very many years that the climate of these islands and of northern Europe in general is far 
milder than it would have been owing to a large body of warm water flowing past its shores 
from the south-west’.8 Likewise, Stephen Dedalus’s remark in Ulysses (1922), ‘All Ireland is 
washed by the gulfstream’ – which, Declan Kiberd observes, echoes a ‘famous line from [an] 
Irish geography book’ – demonstrates that the action of the current was common knowledge 
by this period.9 
The influence of the Gulf Stream was typically regarded with gratitude: a 1905 article 
in the Devon and Exeter Gazette praises the current as ‘an old friend’, ‘a national institution’, 
the beneficent action of which ‘robs the British climate of its asperities’ through the 
‘exceptional mildness of the south-westerly winds’.10 In Lewis’s mind, however, the 
moderating effects of the Gulf Stream had an enervating effect upon English character and 
art. He complains:  
 
SO MUCH VAST MACHINERY TO PRODUCE  
  THE CURATE of ‘Eltham’  
  BRITANNIC ÆSTHETE 
  WILD NATURE CRANK 
  DOMESTICATED  
     POLICEMAN 
  LONDON COLISEUM  
    SOCIALIST-PLAYWRIGHT 
  DALY’S MUSICAL COMEDY 






Envisioning oceanic and atmospheric forces as a vast mechanical system, he regards the 
human and artistic forms fostered by this system as worthy only of disparagement. Painting 
Elizabeth Gaskell, from whose Cousin Phillis the curate of Eltham is drawn, as a 
representative of respectable Victorianism; imputing to Henry Tonks, his former teacher at 
the Slade, a derivative Impressionism; and disparaging both the impulse to return to nature 
and the aesthete’s pursuit of beauty as weakness, Lewis derides the artists and audiences 
produced by prevailing conditions as an apathetic ‘VEGETABLE HUMANITY’ (15).  
Lewis was not alone in this period in attributing a determining cultural influence to 
the environmental conditions of the British Isles, but his assessment of this influence appears 
distinctly contrarian when compared with most other contemporary judgements. In The 
Evacuation of England: The Twist in the Gulf Stream (1908) – a work to which I will return 
later – Louis Gratacap articulates a more commonly held view of the Gulf Stream as a 
‘marvellous oceanic flood’ that ‘controlled the material conditions of England’s greatness 
[…] its wealth, its maritime supremacy, its intellectual distinction, its domestic thrift, and 
sunny sweetness’.11 While associations of climate and character, temperature and 
temperament were commonplace in this period, Lewis’s deployment of these associations 
remains deliberately discordant.12  
As a polemicist who idealised the ‘violent structure of adolescent clearness between 
two extremes’, Lewis presents English character and English art as disadvantaged by a lack 
of stimulating conditions (30). Returning to the theme of climate conditioning art in the 
second BLAST manifesto, he contrasts the mildness of the English climate and the purported 
mediocrity of its art with the cultural growths fostered by more extreme environments. He 
remarks with envy that ‘the steppes and the rigours of the Russian winter, when the peasant 




we associate with the Slav’ (33). The uniformity ascribed to maritime, oceanic climates with 
limited temperature ranges contrasts with the extremes of temperature characteristic of 
inland, continental climates and furnishes Lewis with a climatic rationale for the supposed 
insipidity of English art.  
Having described and denounced the environmental conditions of England, Lewis 
proceeds to recommend their alteration. Discontent with the mildness and moderation of 
England’s present climate, Lewis nonetheless observes that ‘ten years ago we saw both snow 
and ice here’ (12). Taking this as an indication that climate is not invariable, he calls for the 
creation of a more extreme environment, declaring:  
 
May some vulgarly inventive, but useful person, arise,  
       and restore to us the necessary BLIZZARDS.  
LET US ONCE MORE WEAR THE ERMINE  
OF THE NORTH.  
WE BELIEVE IN THE EXISTENCE OF  
THIS USEFUL LITTLE CHEMIST  
IN OUR MIDST! (12) 
 
Like his elaborately contrarian denunciation of England’s climate, Lewis’s call for human-
initiated and -directed climatic change is characteristically Vorticist in its presumption and 
extravagance. While one’s first inclination might be to read this diatribe against the English 
climate as more metaphorical than literal, a comment on cultural rather than physical 
conditions, it is also possible to situate both Lewis’s opening contention that English climate 
determines English culture and his subsequent demand for a human-engineered change in 






Lewis’s foundational assertions in the opening manifestoes of BLAST that climate conditions 
cultural character and environment determines art reflect the discourses of environmental and 
climatic determinism in circulation in the early decades of the twentieth century. As 
geographer Kent M. McGregor defines it, environmental determinism is ‘the notion that the 
physical environment controls or molds human behavior and limits human societies to a 
restricted range of outcomes, or perhaps only one possible outcome, which is thus 
preordained’.13 Climatic determinism further narrows the causal factor, linking ‘the 
individual and individual behaviour to some aspect of climate’ or, in a wider ranging 
formulation, ‘the climate of a place to the culture, society, and history of that place’.14  
Environmental determinism was not a new concept in the early twentieth century. The 
premise that environment generally, and climate specifically, shaped culture and directed 
history had been advanced by figures from Aristotle and Hippocrates to Montesquieu and 
Hume.15 In The Spirit of Laws (1748), Montesquieu claimed that ‘great heat enervates the 
strength and courage of men and that in cold climates they have a certain vigor of body and 
mind which renders them capable of long, painful, great and intrepid actions’.16 A century 
and a half later, Ellen Churchill Semple advanced a similar argument, declaring that the 
warm tropics constituted a ‘nursery’ that kept inhabitants of those regions in a state of 
‘arrested development’ while the temperate zone subjected its inhabitants to a salutary form 
of compulsion that prompted invention.17 Such theories were clearly committed to the 
construction of hierarchies of place, race, and culture that were then claimed to be natural.18 
In A Passage to India (1924), E. M. Forster attributes just such a ‘theory of climatic zones’ to 




differentiation on the grounds of region and race himself, declaring that ‘rebels of the North 
and South are diametrically opposed species’ (42). 
Although Lewis’s diagnosis of England’s climate as debilitatingly mild might initially 
seem at odds with Semple’s praise of the temperate zone as ‘preëminently the culture zone of 
the earth’, Lewis simply transposes the determinist claim that warmth is enervating into the 
even more extreme and thus more suitably Vorticist argument that the moderate climate of 
temperate England is insufficiently stimulating.20 However, while disparaging England’s 
climate and cultural forms as he finds them, mild and moderate, Lewis also develops a vision 
of England as he would have it, transformed both environmentally and aesthetically. He calls 
for the intensification of the climatic conditions of England as a means of promoting greater 
vigour and acuity in its art, and he articulates his ideal conception of English art through an 
image of plant life conditioned by its environment: envisioning the ‘specific nature of the art 
destined to grow up in this country’, he asserts, ‘the art for these climates, then, must be a 
northern flower’ (36).  
In developing this cultural ideal, Lewis takes another historical period as his climatic 
model. He praises Shakespeare for his ‘bitter Northern Rhetoric of humour’ and declares that 
‘Shakespeare reflected in his imagination a mysticism, madness and delicacy peculiar to the 
North’ (26, 37). Shakespeare and the Elizabethans represent to Lewis not only ‘the freest and 
most vigorous period of ENGLAND’S history’, but also a more bracing climate (37). Lewis’s 
sense of the age of Shakespeare as a more northerly time – of the Elizabethan era as another, 
colder country – aligns with the fact that his call for a change in climate at the outset of the 
first BLAST manifesto was a call for the restoration of blizzards and a return to a former 
cultural dispensation symbolised by the wearing of ‘THE ERMINE OF THE NORTH’ (12). 
His desire for cold is not a desire for wholesale climatic novelty but rather for the 




Lewis’s vision of the early modern period as a colder time had a basis in reality. 
Although instrumental temperature records do not exist for late sixteenth- and early 
seventeenth-century Britain, reconstructions from historical records and proxy data suggest 
that the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were on average cooler and more given 
to variability and extremes of temperature than the early twentieth century. Climatologist H. 
H. Lamb states: 
 
in the middle of the sixteenth century, a remarkably sharp change occurred. And over 
the next 150 years or so the evidence points to the coldest regime – though 
accompanied by notable great variations from year to year and from one group of a 
few years to the next – at any time since the last major ice age ended.21  
 
Discussing the period that has come to be termed the Little Ice Age (roughly 1300 to 1850, 
although opinions vary on the dating of this interval), Brian Fagan describes ‘centuries of 
unpredictability’ when ‘Britain and the Continent suffered through great storminess and more 
frequent shifts from extreme cold to much warmer conditions’.22 Fagan cautions that the 
conception of this period as one of unrelenting cold is inaccurate, explaining, ‘There was 
never a monolithic deep freeze, rather a climatic seesaw that swung constantly backwards 
and forwards, in volatile and sometimes disastrous shifts’.23 
Although in Lewis’s time, the concept of the Little Ice Age had yet to be proposed, 
there was a wide-spread perception that there had been periods of greater cold and greater 
variability in temperature in England’s historical past. Newspapers would intermittently offer 
accounts of ‘old-fashioned winters’, describing the great frosts recorded in historical 
chronicles and recounted by diarists such as John Evelyn.24 The best-remembered modernist 




of a frost fair on the frozen Thames, drawn from Thomas Dekker’s account of the Great Frost 
of 1607-08 and augmented by John Evelyn’s account of the Great Frost of 1683-84.25 Like 
Lewis, Woolf suggests a link between the character of the climate and the character of an 
age. Describing the temporal setting in which Orlando opens, Woolf’s narrator declares:  
 
The age was the Elizabethan; their morals were not ours; nor their poets; nor their 
climate; nor their vegetables even. Everything was different. The weather itself, the 
heat and cold of summer and winter, was, we may believe, of another temper 
altogether.26  
 
Like Lewis again, Woolf presents changes in climate as instigating cultural changes. As the 
skies fill with cloud at the start of the nineteenth century, Woolf’s narrator reports, ‘the 
constitution of England was altered’: damp crept into hearts, minds, and inkpots, and 
vegetation, population, and adjectives multiplied and swelled.27 
The theory of climatic determinism encompassed conceptions of changing climate as 
a driver of historical events and societal change. As with the theory of climatic determinism 
itself, the notion that climate can change and that these changes impact human history and 
culture had antecedents stretching back to at least the classical period. By the start of the 
twentieth century, the fact of alternating glacial and genial periods (as they were then termed) 
on geological time scales was well established, and theories of climatic change on shorter 
time scales were also in circulation. Over the closing decades of the nineteenth century and 
the opening decades of the twentieth century, Piotr Kropotkin developed a theory that the 
Eurasian continent had been undergoing a process of gradual desiccation since the end of the 
last ice age and that this climatic trend had at intervals driven inhabitants of the continental 




year cycles of wet and warm or dry and cold weather.29 In 1907, Ellsworth Huntington 
promulgated a theory of climatic pulsations, oscillations in climate with a periodicity of 
centuries discernible within the span of recorded history. Huntington argued that these 
climatic pulsations were responsible for the rise and decline of past civilizations, declaring:  
 
With every throb of the climatic pulse […] the centre of civilization has moved this 
way or that. Each throb has sent pain and decay to the lands whose day was done, life 
and vigor to those whose day was yet to be.30  
 
Lewis in BLAST goes a step further than Huntington, arguing that a climatic regime 
advantageous to a given culture might be instigated through human action. In his call for the 
restoration of blizzards by a useful little chemist, Lewis imagines intervening in natural 
processes to produce new conditions that will act upon culture in the same deterministic 
manner as before. He envisions closing the circle of influence, transforming ‘VEGETABLE 
HUMANITY’, its culture, and its art by manipulating the conditions under which these forms 
develop (15). Lewis’s call for anthropogenic climatic change as a means of fostering 
Vorticist art may appear arrogant and implausible, but his outlook is not wholly inconsistent 
with that of his contemporaries. Scientists, journalists, and speculative fiction writers in the 
early twentieth century offered a range of visions of climatic change resulting from human 
activity. At times this change was presented as accidentally initiated, at times as deliberate; at 
times it was imagined as occurring slowly over the course of centuries, at times as a rapid and 
potentially imminent change; at times it was envisioned as beneficial, at times as 
catastrophic. Although Lewis’s call for cooling contrasted with the general tendency to 




as a phenomenon that could be influenced or even directed by human action had parallels in 
contemporary scientific and popular discourse.  
 
Theories of Climatic Change: Ice Ages and Carbon Emissions 
One scientific discussion ongoing in this period that encompassed not only ideas of climatic 
change but also the possibility of anthropogenic climatic change was the investigation into 
the causes of ice ages. By the later nineteenth century, the fact of past ice ages was no longer 
disputed and attention had turned to discussions of the cause or causes of glacial periods. 
Nico Stehr, Hans von Storch, and Moritz Flügel comment that there was such a ‘wealth of 
competing hypotheses’ that the discussion threatened to become ‘a cacophony of mere 
opinions’.31 
The promulgation of a new scientific theory regarding the mechanism responsible for 
the onset of ice ages would from time to time bring the subject into wider public discussion. 
In 1913, both scientific journals such as Nature and newspapers such as the Morning Post 
carried articles outlining a theory, recently advanced by W. J. Humphreys, that volcanic dust 
in the atmosphere in sufficiently large quantities and for sufficiently long time periods could 
reduce insolation enough to bring about the onset of ice age conditions. The Nature article, 
titled ‘The Origin of Climatic Changes’, took the opportunity of this new theory to review the 
‘[n]umerous theories, both probable and improbable’ that had been advanced to explain the 
climate’s oscillation between warm and cold periods.32 Summarising the three theories then 
regarded as most worthy of consideration, the article lists: 
 
the Eccentricity Theory (Croll) depending on the eccentricity of the earth’s orbit; the 




amount of carbon dioxide; and thirdly, the Solar Variation Theory, on the assumption 
of solar changes of long duration.33  
 
The article credits Humphreys with ‘restart[ing] a topic which will no doubt call for criticism 
and discussion from many quarters’.34 A 1913 article in the Leicester Daily Post entitled 
‘Discovery and Invention. World-Wide Changes of Climate’ recounts the origin of 
Humphreys’s theory. Humphreys, observing from historical records and contemporary 
observations the ‘marked lessening’ of solar radiation reaching the earth’s surface in the 
aftermath of the eruptions of Krakatoa (1883), Mount Pelée (1902), and Katmai (1912), 
posited that volcanic dust thrown into the upper atmosphere by such eruptions would spread 
across the whole stratosphere and settle only very slowly back to earth, in the process 
impeding and scattering incoming solar energy and lowering the temperature at the earth’s 
surface.35 Humphreys extrapolated from this observed short-term climatic variability to argue 
that, continued for long enough, the obstruction of incoming solar radiation by volcanic ash 
could create the conditions for a new ice age.36  
Humphreys’s theory was only the latest of many theories regarding the causes of 
climatic change circulating in the early twentieth century, and the Leicester Daily Post article 
rehearses some of the then-prevailing theories, including the argument that ‘an excess of 
carbonic dioxide [sic] in the atmosphere besides profoundly affecting the life of the earth 
would also modify the heat receptivity of the atmosphere’.37 This theory, from which the 
current understanding of the effect of CO2 on the climatic conditions of the earth in part 
derives, was promulgated in 1896 by the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius in the article ‘On 
the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground’. Motivated 
by the ‘extraordinary interest’ of the question of ‘the probable causes of the Ice Age’ and 




determine the effect of existing levels of atmospheric CO2 on the temperature at the earth’s 
surface and the change in temperature that would result from a given change in atmospheric 
carbon dioxide levels.38 He offered calculations of the magnitude of temperature decrease 
that would accompany incremental decreases in atmospheric CO2 and the magnitude of 
temperature increase that would accompany incremental increases in atmospheric CO2.
39   
Also in his 1896 article, Arrhenius cites, almost in passing, the calculation of his 
colleague Arvid Högbom that CO2 emissions from the burning of pit coal amounted to 500 
million tons a year and that at this level, industrial CO2 emissions ‘“may be regarded as 
completely compensating the quantity of carbonic acid that is consumed”’ by natural 
processes such as weathering.40 Arrhenius offered no specific conclusions of his own 
regarding the effects of industrial carbon emissions upon global temperatures in his 1896 
article, but in a talk given in the same year Arrhenius returned to Högbom’s calculations, 
commenting: 
 
the consumption of coal on earth is so great that it produces annually a quantity of 
carbonic acid […] of the same order of magnitude as, and it appears fully to be equal 
to, the most important and practically the only process of carbonic acid absorption 
operating on the earth’s surface, namely weathering. Since, in addition, carbonic acid is 
produced in volcanic processes and other circumstances, it would seem to be probable 
that the carbonic acid content in the air is at present gradually rising. […] The burning 
of coal alone would thus be capable of raising the temperature of the surface of the 
earth by somewhat more than one thousandth of a degree centigrade per annum.41 
 
With this statement, Arrhenius asserts the view that anthropogenic CO2 emissions can cause 




subsequent commentary on this observation is equally important as an illustration of turn-of-
the-century attitudes towards the possibility of anthropogenic climatic change. Having 
declared that the human consumption of coal is causing a net rise in atmospheric CO2, 
Arrhenius proceeds to suggest that ‘we […] have some right to indulge in the pleasant belief 
that our descendants, albeit after many generations, might live under a milder sky and in less 
barren natural surroundings than is our lot at present’.42 Predisposed by both his focus of 
research (ice ages) and his own geographical location (northern Europe) to regard cooling as 
a threat, Arrhenius interprets the prospect of warming as cheering.  
Arrhenius also promoted his carbon dioxide theory of climatic change and the 
prospect of anthropogenically induced warming to a wider reading public. In Worlds in the 
Making: The Evolution of the Universe, a work of popular science writing published in 
Swedish in 1906 and in English translation in 1908, Arrhenius again explains: 
 
[C]omparatively unimportant variations in the composition of the air have a very 
great influence. If the quantity of carbonic acid in the air should sink to one-half of its 
present percentage, the temperature would fall by about 4°; a diminution to one-
quarter would reduce the temperature by 8°. On the other hand, any doubling of the 
percentage of carbon dioxide in the air would raise the temperature of the earth’s 
surface by 4°; and if the carbon dioxide were increased fourfold, the temperature 
would rise by 8°.43 
 
Arrhenius also returns in this work of popular science to the significance of the novel factor 
of anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Whereas in 1896 he quoted Högbom’s figure of 500 million 
tons for the annual consumption of pit coal, in 1904, at the time of writing Worlds in the 




increase. He therefore predicts that, even taking into account the absorptive capacity of the 
oceans, ‘the slight percentage of carbonic acid in the atmosphere may by the advances of 
industry be changed to a noticeable degree in the course of a few centuries’.44 The novel 
factor of anthropogenic CO2 emissions gave Arrhenius reason to argue that a future ice age 
might be deferred indefinitely through human intervention in the climate. Posing the 
question, ‘Is it probable that we shall in coming geological ages be visited by a new ice 
period that will drive us from our temperate countries into the hotter climates of Africa?’, 
Arrhenius replies confidently in the negative, suggesting that modern industrial development 
had fortuitously provided the means of averting such threats in the future.45 
Arrhenius was not wholly untroubled by the rapidly rising consumption of fossil 
fuels. He acknowledges the concern that ‘the coal stored up in the earth is wasted by the 
present generation without any thought for the future’.46 However, convinced as he was that 
the present genial climate would in time naturally give way to more glacial conditions, 
Arrhenius found cause for comfort in the idea that humans, by means of the burning of fossil 
fuels, had the power artificially to raise global temperatures. He states: 
 
We may find a kind of consolation in the consideration that here, as in every other 
case, there is good mixed with the evil. By the influence of the increasing percentage 
of carbonic acid in the atmosphere, we may hope to enjoy ages with more equable and 
better climates, especially as regards the colder regions of the earth.47  
 
As Arrhenius’s biographer Elisabeth Crawford argues, Arrhenius’s perception of human-
induced warming as beneficial was shaped by his focus on the question of the causes of ice 
ages, a focus that inevitably brought with it a fear of cooling, a seemingly rational 




glacial period. In addition to his preoccupation with cooling, Arrhenius failed to anticipate 
the rate at which anthropogenic carbon emissions would increase over the century to come 
and, by extension, the rate at which global temperatures would rise. Finally, Crawford 
suggests that Arrhenius’s response was shaped by ‘the ideology of “optimistic 
evolutionism”’, a belief in the progressive development of humankind that prevented him 
from contemplating the potential liabilities of industrial advance.48 
Arrhenius was not alone in responding with optimism to the idea that anthropogenic 
carbon emissions could alter global climate. Arrhenius’s colleague Nils Ekholm, writing in 
the Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society in 1901, approached the concept 
of anthropogenic climatic change with the view that the earth was in a phase of natural 
cooling – or, as he termed it, ‘deterioration’ – due to the variation of the obliquity of the 
ecliptic of the planet (an astronomical phenomenon which was at the time projected to cause 
cooling for the next 10,000 years).49 Working from the assumption that future human 
flourishing would depend upon a capacity to counteract an astronomically induced trend of 
cooling, Ekholm sought means by which the natural release of CO2 into the atmosphere by 
processes such as volcanic activity might be augmented, and he found such a means in 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Ekholm went even further than Arrhenius in his vision of 
human-directed climatic change, suggesting the possibility of deliberately increasing the 
concentration of atmospheric CO2 by digging ‘deep fountains pouring out carbonic acid’ and 
intervening to lessen processes, such as geological weathering, that removed CO2 from the 
atmosphere.50 By such tactics, Ekholm argued, ‘it seems possible that Man will be able 
efficaciously to regulate the future climate of the earth and consequently prevent the arrival 
of a new Ice Age’.51 While he admits that it is ‘too early to judge of how far Man might be 
capable of thus regulating the future climate’, Ekholm sees deliberate and directed climatic 




Ekholm’s initial motivation for considering the effects of anthropogenic CO2 
emissions was in fact conservative: he viewed human intervention in climate as necessary to 
maintain existing climatic conditions in the face of natural cooling. However, Ekholm’s 
concluding vision of global climatic control exceeds the audacity of even Lewis’s invocation 
of a useful little chemist to restore blizzards to England. Lewis, Arrhenius, and Ekholm are 
akin in the sense that all three fear or resent some natural circumstance of climate, whether it 
be England’s mildness or the anticipated deterioration of the global climate towards ice age 
conditions, and all three also envision human intervention in natural processes – and 
chemical intervention in natural processes at that – as offering the solution to these 
unsatisfactory natural circumstances.  
 
Theories of Climatic Change: Diverting the Gulf Stream 
The theory of global warming by way of rising atmospheric CO2 levels was only one of 
several theories of climatic change in circulation in the opening decades of the twentieth 
century, and it was not in fact the one that garnered the most popular attention. One concern 
that resurfaced in the newspaper press repeatedly over the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century and the opening decades of the twentieth centred on Britain’s reliance on the Gulf 
Stream for its mild climate and the possibility that this vital climatic influence might be 
diverted, either through natural accident or deliberate interference.  
As has already been indicated in the discussion of Lewis’s first BLAST manifesto, the 
moderating effect of the Gulf Stream upon the climate of northern Europe was common 
knowledge in this period. St James’s Gazette in 1899 declared the Gulf Stream to be 
‘indissolubly connected […] with the many blessings of our sacred English climate’.53 
However, concerns over the future course of the Gulf Stream arose as a result of the 




the Atlantic and the Pacific. Fears that this might affect the course of the Gulf Stream were 
voiced as early as 1860, but the subject gained wider circulation in the wake of an 1868 
lecture by a St Louis captain, Silas Bent, promoting a plan ‘to divert Equatorial water into the 
Panama Canal and thus to leave Europe generally, and England more particularly “out in the 
cold” in a very literal and unpleasant sense’.54 Reporting on this plan in May 1871, The Times 
observed that Bent argued that to divert the Gulf Stream would be to do no more than to 
reduce northern Europe to its ‘“normal climatic conditions”’, as determined by latitude.55 
Bent’s argument, with its imputation of deliberate, politically motivated climatic sabotage, 
made a lasting impression. Twelve years after Bent’s lecture, an article in the Globe 
reflected:  
 
most of us have soberly considered the appalling results which would ensue if some 
freak of nature should divert [the Gulf Stream] from north-western Europe, or if, as 
the Yankees have before now hinted that they might do one day, they should buy up 
the Isthmus of Panama and knock a hole through it big enough to let the stream out 
into the Pacific […] that should bring upon us an Arctic climate and the dreary 
sterility of another Labrador.56 
 
The attribution of nefarious climatic intentions varied with time and circumstance: in 1881, 
as the French began work on a canal across the isthmus under the direction of Ferdinand de 
Lesseps, the Penny Illustrated Paper demanded, ‘Will Mr. Gladstone permit M. de Lesseps 
quietly to deprive England of the Gulf Stream?’.57 
The possibility that breaching the Isthmus of Panama would alter the course, 
functioning, and climatic effects of the Gulf Stream, with consequences for the climate of 




sometimes not – across the decades-long efforts, first by France, then by America, to dig a 
canal across Panama, an undertaking that was only successfully completed in 1914. Around 
the turn of the century, in the wake of the failure of the French attempt to complete the canal 
and with American interest in the project reviving, old fears resurfaced. Newspapers 
resuscitated the idea that ‘the cutting of the American continent would deflect the course of 
the Gulf Stream and leave Great Britain with a temperature similar to Greenland’, and once 
again, the prospect of climatic change was framed in distinctly political terms.58 St James’s 
Gazette warned of ‘threats against the Gulf Stream […] in clear defiance of the Monroe 
Doctrine’.59 The invocation of the political doctrine of separate spheres emphasises the 
enmeshment of the cultural and the climatological in this putative threat.  
In 1912, as the canal neared completion, thoughts of climatic variability came again to 
public consciousness. The Graphic recalled how ‘the wiseacres of the halfpenny Post some 
years ago were all warning us that, once the Panama Canal was constructed, the course of the 
Gulf Stream would be diverted, and that Europe would experience a return of the Ice Age’.60 
Elaborating on this idea for the purpose of geopolitical satire in a segment titled ‘After 
Panama – The Deluge’, the Graphic remarks, ‘Possibly the Gulf Stream […] will either be 
diverted by the United States or made a dutiable commodity for which we British […] will 
have to pay a duty measured either in gallons or in degrees of water temperature’.61 The idea 
of the climatic destruction of Britain by feats of American engineering served in part as a 
vehicle through which to articulate anxieties that the balance of political and economic power 
was shifting from Europe to America. Nevertheless, concerns over the divergence of the Gulf 
Stream were not purely analogical. Another 1912 article entitled ‘Glaciers and the Gulf 
Stream. Is Another Ice Age Coming?’ cautions, ‘Few of us realise how entirely we are, in 
matters of climate, at the mercy of the Gulf Stream’, and quotes from an article in the Grand 





‘If by some planetary or other influence the great body of warm water known as the 
Gulf Stream which sweeps across the Atlantic from the Gulf of Mexico and bathes the 
coasts of Britain with its vivifying flood, were but to be diverted from its course ever 
so slightly, gone in a day would be almost all the natural advantages that have enabled 
the Anglo-Saxon race to occupy the predominant position it does in the world’.62  
 
The quoted Grand Magazine columnist further warns that such a turn of events is ‘“by no 
means impossible, especially in view of the way in which man is endeavouring to obtain an 
entire control over land and water”’.63 
Perhaps the best indicator of the wide currency of the idea that the diversion of the 
Gulf Stream would bring about a change in the climate of northern Europe is the range of 
incongruous contexts in which the idea occurs in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
A 1902 article discussing the feasibility of supplying electricity to towns comments that 
‘were there no summer season municipal electricity would be self-supporting’. 64 Reflecting 
further on the relationship between climate and the profitability of electricity as a commodity, 
the author brightens at the thought that ‘when the Panama Canal is completed […] this local 
stumbling block will be removed, as the Gulf Stream which now warms our shores will likely 
set in the direction of the poles’, producing a climate much more in need of electrical 
heating.65 The prospect of cooling also finds its way into political commentary. A 1903 
article in the London Daily News titled ‘Not Warm Enough’ satirises Neville Chamberlain’s 
protectionist Tariff Reform League by likening a protectionist policy on trade to the onset of 
climatic cooling, suggesting that as ‘the cutting of the Panama Canal will yet further divert 
the Gulf Stream […] soon Great Britain will be growing her own beavers, seals, bears, 




grapes’.66 A decade later, as the canal approached completion, such incongruous mentions 
continued. A fashion note in the Leeds Mercury in June 1911 reports on the popularity of hats 
and parasols during a recent stretch of hot weather before concluding, ‘Perhaps when the 
Panama Canal is opened we shall find the Gulf Stream going another way. Let us, then, make 
the most of what remains us’.67 In a similarly offhand tone, a note on the Belvoir hunt in the 
Grantham Journal for 27 December 1913 remarks: 
 
At the time of writing, the weather is still mild and open, and, unless the Gulf Stream 
strays away through the Panama Canal, there appears no reason to anticipate severe 
weather just yet […] so it looks as if the Belvoir Hounds will carry out their 
admirable Yuletide programme.68  
 
Such casual asides on the subject of climatic change do not suggest that the diversion of the 
Gulf Stream elicited a great deal of genuine concern by this period; at the same time, they 
illustrate the fact that the idea had become something of a commonplace in popular discourse.  
The scientific community largely rejected the idea that the opening of the Panama 
Canal would result in the diversion of the Gulf Stream. In 1882, the geologist James Geikie 
weighed in on the subject in a widely reprinted article titled ‘The Gulf Stream and the 
Panama Canal’. While agreeing that the diversion of the Gulf Stream from its existing course 
would be a catastrophe for the British Isles and the Scandinavian Peninsula, Geikie offers 
reassurance from a different quarter, arguing that the Isthmus of Panama ‘would need to be 
sunk to a depth of not less than 800 feet, and perhaps even 1,000 feet’ – a depth greatly 
exceeding that of the planned canal – for the course of the Gulf Stream to be affected by the 
breach.69 Thus, he concludes, ‘we need have no apprehension that we shall be deprived of the 




Another striking attempt to refute speculation regarding the effects of the digging of 
the Panama Canal upon the course of the Gulf Stream came in the form of a scale model of 
the world’s landmasses and oceans constructed in 1889 by Arthur W. Clayden. Water 
directed by bellows replicated the movement of ocean currents and both the Panama Canal 
and Central America were represented by removable sections, so that the effects of removing 
first one, then both could be seen. The model was displayed at both a Royal Society soirée 
and a Royal Geographical Society conversazione and was enthusiastically remarked upon in 
newspaper reports of both events. Clayden demonstrated that the removal of the Panama 
Canal section of the model had no effect upon the course of the ocean currents, while the 
removal of the Central America section as a whole caused the current representing the Gulf 
Stream to pass into the Pacific. Clayden’s model and the popular accounts offered of it 
illustrate the interest among members of both the scientific community and the newspaper-
reading public in the question of the effect of the digging of the Panama Canal upon the 
action of the Gulf Stream.71  
The reassurances offered by scientists such as Geikie and Clayden were no doubt 
comforting to some, but others simply modified their narratives to accommodate the 
proffered facts. By far the most elaborate example of this occurs in Louis Gratacap’s 1908 
novel The Evacuation of England: The Twist in the Gulf Stream. Gratacap imagines a 
scenario in which the digging of the Panama Canal accidentally triggers a chain of seismic 
events culminating in the complete subsidence of the Isthmus of Panama between Costa Rica 
and Columbia and the consequent divergence of the Gulf Stream into the Pacific. The 
withdrawal of the warming influence of the Gulf Stream from northern Europe leads in turn 
to the evacuation of Iceland as well as most of Scandinavia and the British Isles.  
Gratacap’s novel to some extent follows the expected arc of the environmental 




(driven by a profit motive) triggering environmental disaster and, by extension, social 
upheaval and human loss. However, while presenting the subsidence of the isthmus as an 
environmental disaster instigated by human actions, Gratacap does not characterise the event 
as wholly negative. The narrative passes quickly over the direct consequences of the 
subsidence of the isthmus for the inhabitants of the region itself, remarking only, ‘The loss of 
life had been considerable, but not proportionate to the stupendous agencies involved’ (117). 
In keeping with the politically charged discussions of the Gulf Stream and the Panama Canal 
in the press, the American characters in Gratacap’s novel are on the whole pleased that the 
‘titanic convulsions of nature’ triggered by human engineering works have created such ‘a 
wide and useful passage for commerce’, and the narrator summarises the American viewpoint 
with the statement, ‘if the Gulf Stream was deflected, if it meant blight for England, what of 
it? The United States would only become greater. […] [T]he mutations of the earth’s surface 
only brought to them unrivalled aptitudes for new chances, new power’ (119, 125). Silas 
Bent’s dream is fulfilled in Gratacap’s narrative.  
Perhaps more surprisingly, even the narrative’s representative Englishman, Alexander 
Leacraft, views the consequences of the redirection of the Gulf Stream as ‘remarkable and 
not altogether regrettable’ (99). Although there are phases of alarm in the narrative, as the 
populations of first Scotland, then England are forced to flee before ‘the pitiless rigor of a 
new dispensation in climate’, Leacraft perceives opportunity in the midst of disaster, 
declaring, ‘Perhaps the old receptacles of civilization needed emptying; their garnered seeds 
to be more quickly cast upon the winds of chance to germinate and flower again in the waste 
places of the world’ (133, 162). Leacraft’s friend Thomsen follows this line of argument 
further, declaring, ‘all that has come between the present and the past, like the sundering of 
Damocles’ sword, has saved us from the necessity of denuding ourselves of old things, 




(299-300). Such statements, celebrating a clean break with the past, have the quality of an 
avant-garde manifesto. Meanwhile, Gratacap envisions the destruction of Britain as 
inaugurating a new era of imperialism. The British government is relocated to Australia to 
begin a ‘new experiment’, ‘the Australian England’, and Leacraft describes the departing 
leaders as ‘pictures of Hope, lit up by the imaginative flamings of Ambition. […] The 
English leaders dreamed of new achievements, a new literature, a greatness vastly exceeding 
all historic records’ (288, 303, 287). (Incidentally, the dispersal of the population of Great 
Britain occurs with minimal difficulty, facilitated by bureaucratic mechanisms likened to a 
modern Domesday survey and aided as well by the generosity with which other nations 
welcome Britain’s refugees.) The narrative’s conclusion suggests that Leacraft’s optimism is 
justified: Leacraft closes his story with the reflection, ‘The convulsions which were so 
dismally foretold, in the social and political fabric […] never occurred. They were quite lost 
sight of in the wonderful happenings of the world’ (320). Gratacap’s novel constitutes the 
most detailed elaboration of the premise that the Gulf Stream could be diverted, causing a 
rapid drop in temperatures in north-western Europe.72 His coupling of an account of material 
destruction and social displacement with a wildly optimistic vision of political and cultural 
rejuvenation bears comparison to the most radical avant-garde calls for destruction as a 
means of renewal.  
The diversion of the Gulf Stream into the Pacific was only ever presented as a 
possible secondary consequence of the creation of the Panama Canal. The primary purpose of 
the waterway was always to shorten the route of travel between the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
However, there were other schemes articulated in the same period that presented the 
diversion of the Gulf Stream as their sole or primary aim. In November 1899, British 
newspapers were briefly full of stories announcing a ‘Yankee Enterprise’ ‘To Divert the Gulf 




‘ingenious idea’ of an American engineer, Mr. Sloper, to dig a canal through the Florida 
peninsula in order to ‘divert the Gulf Stream from the West Coast of Europe to the East Coast 
of America, and thus to transfer at least a portion of the comparatively warm temperature, 
with all its consequences, from the Old to the New Continent’.74 St James’s Gazette judged 
the Florida Canal scheme to be even more ‘openly defiant of our comfort’ than the Panama 
Canal and denounced the proposed attempt to ‘lave the Eastern coasts of [America] with all 
those tepid streams that of immemorial right are ours’.75 The Florida Canal scheme remained 
no more than a newspaper story, but it is notable that such a monumental engineering project 
could be contemplated for the sole and express purpose of redirecting an ocean current in 
order to alter the climatic conditions of a region.  
While the Florida Canal was never more than a story, other comparably audacious 
plans advanced somewhat further. In 1913, a proposal aimed at creating ‘An Iceless Arctic’ 
was reported in several British papers. The plan, proposed by Carrloo Livingstone Riker, 
involved the construction of a two-hundred-mile-long jetty off the coast of Newfoundland in 
order ‘to completely separate the Gulf Stream and the Labrador Current’, preventing the 
dilution of the warm water of the former by the cold water of the latter and thereby creating 
‘a literally iceless Arctic’.76 In accordance with an engineer’s desire for maximum efficiency, 
the jetty scheme was intended to optimise the warming effects of the Gulf Stream. In this 
instance, heat was not to be taken from one nation for the benefit of another, but rather the 
heat of the Gulf Stream was to be enhanced for the benefit of all North Atlantic nations. The 
article quotes speculation in the Philadelphia Record that if the arctic explorer Robert Peary 
had delayed his expedition to the north pole until the completion of the jetty, he would have 
found the journey ‘“a mere pleasure jaunt”’ through open water rather than an arduous ice-
bound trek.77 No thought is given in this article to the wider consequences that would follow 




Although, like the Florida Canal scheme, the Newfoundland Jetty project never 
became a reality, the idea received enough support that ‘a Bill for an appropriation of 
100,000 dollars for the creation of a proposed Federal Commission to make preliminary 
investigations with a view to carrying out the undertaking’ was introduced to Congress by 
New York Congressman William Calder, and engineering authorities linked to the Panama 
Canal project and to the United States Army ‘expressed belief in the practicability of Mr. 
Riker’s plan’.78 As with the plan for the Florida Canal, the significance of the Newfoundland 
Jetty scheme lies in the fact that its sole objective was the diversion of ocean currents for the 
purpose of altering climatic conditions.  
Contemporary popular discussions reveal a degree of apprehension regarding the 
possible effects of human intervention – deliberate or otherwise – in climatic systems, but 
they also reveal a countercurrent of optimism running through not only speculative fiction but 
also scientific and public discourse. While Lewis’s summoning of blizzards remains 
extravagant, it is on a continuum with a municipal electricity supplier’s optimistic 
anticipation of falling temperatures, Gratacap’s vision of a new England in Australia, and 
schemes such as the Florida Canal and the Newfoundland Jetty. 
 
Conclusion 
There was a discourse of climatic change, one with many strands – scientific and popular, 
fictional and non-fictional – in circulation in the early twentieth century. Aspects of this 
discourse, most notably Arrhenius’s recognition that anthropogenic CO2 emissions could 
significantly alter the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere and that this could result in a 
rise in global temperatures, have become central to the early twenty-first-century 
understanding of anthropogenic climate change. However, alongside these continuities 




make strange the attitudes of early twentieth-century scientists and engineers, speculative 
fiction writers and avant-garde polemicists.   
One key difference between the current discourse of climate change and the early 
twentieth-century discourse of climatic change concerns the question of intentionality. 
Griffiths, writing of twenty-first-century notions of climate change, characterises 
anthropogenic climate change as change that is ‘unintentionally engendered’ by human 
activity.79 However, early twentieth-century writers engage with the notion of anthropogenic 
climatic change as something that might – and perhaps should or even must – be deliberately 
instigated as a means of regulating environmental conditions for human benefit. This view 
was not universal amongst early twentieth-century commentators, but it was a clearly 
discernible strand of thought. The anthropogenic modification of climate was recommended 
at times on the grounds of the maintenance of existing conditions in the face of natural trends 
of climatic deterioration (Ekholm), at times as a form of gradual climatic improvement 
(Arrhenius), and even at times as a means of geopolitical manoeuvring (Bent, Sloper). Lewis 
was undeniably contrarian in his views – while others feared the onset of cooling, he sought 
means to summon blizzards – but, preferences for the glacial or the genial aside, his 
presumptuousness aligns with contemporaneous scientific and popular speculation. In spite or 
perhaps because of his vociferous embrace of extremes, Lewis is less an outlier from than an 
exemplar of early twentieth-century views on the cultural impact of climate, the susceptibility 
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